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EQUITY-1957 TENNESSEE SURVEY
THOMAS F. GREEN. JR.*
JURISDICTION
Among what is said' to be the largest number of public laws ever
passed by a Tennessee Legislature, the General Assembly passed an act
which creates a statutory exception to the doctrine that equity will
not enjoin the commission of a crime unless the conduct comes within
some recognized head of equity jurisdiction. The statute2 makes bar-
ratry a misdemeanor and continues:
Courts of record having equity jurisdiction shall have jurisdiction to
enjoin barratry. Suits for an injunction may be brought by the district
attorney general of the district in which the offense is committed.3
The statute contains the following definition: "(a) 'Barratry' is the
offense of stirring up litigation. '4
The statute is listed in one classification of the General Assembly's
1957 output as race relations legislation. 5
EQUITABLE REMEDIES
Hall v. Briton6 was a suit in the chancery court to enjoin defend-
ants, who were complainant's former employees, from selling a
product produced with the aid of complainant's trade secret. Defend-
ant appealed from a decree for complainant. The court of appeals
stated that injunctive relief is extraordinary and should be granted
with great caution and only after full and ample evidence that it is
necessary but held that under the circumstances presented in this
action, wherein it was determined that defendants were using com-
plainant's trade secret to produce a competing product, injunctive
relief was warranted. It also was held that in a cause tried according
to the forms of chancery the appellant is entitled to a re-examination
of the whole matter of law and fact appearing in the record. The
appellate court will not, however, substitute its judgment as to the
credibility of witnesses, if there is nothing else in the evidence, such
as documentary evidence or evident self-contradiction of the witness,
or irreconcilable impeachment of the witness, or testimony contrary
to facts of which the court should take judicial notice or other
* Visiting Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University, 1956-57.
1. Legislative Bulletin (1957), Bar Association of Tennessee, 1.
2. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 104, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3405 to -3410 (Supp.
1957), amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3212 (1956).
3. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 104, § 6, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3409 (Supp. 1957).
4. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 104, § 1, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3405 (Supp. 1957)
5. Legislative Bulletin (1957), Bar Association of Tennessee, 6.
6. 292 S.W.2d 524 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).
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matter to overcome the presumption of correctness of the judgment or
decree below.
Nicely v. Nicely7 was a proceeding to sell for partition certain tracts
of land wherein defendant filed a cross-bill alleging that the land
should-be divided in kind., The court of appeals held that the evidence
was sufficient to support a finding that the two tracts were not suscep-
tible to partition in kind among the parties who held title thereto as
tenants: in common and that it would be advantageous to all parties
that the land be sold and the proceeds divided among those entitled
thereto. The test for determining whether land should be sold instead
of partitioned in kind is whether it will bring more money when sold
as a whole than the several shares would bring in the aggregate when
sold separately to different purchasers after a partition in kind.
In the case of Hackett v. Steele,8 the Supreme Court of Tennessee
affirmed'a decree of the Chancery Court, Hamilton County, sustaining
the demurrer to a bill to cancel restrictions on lots in a residential
subdivision restricted to residences on the alleged ground that there
had been such a radical change in the physical condition of the prop-
erty because of municipal expansion and the spread of the commercial
district of Chattanooga that enforcement of the restrictions was in-
equitable and the purpose for which the restrictions were imposed
could no longer be accomplished. The court said that the bill was
insufficient because it failed to allege that there had been such a radical
change in the neighborhood that the purposes of the restrictive cov-
enants relating to the entire subdivision had become burdensome and
were not being maintained for the benefit of the owners of the lots.
In Preston v. Smith,9 Judge Shriver, speaking for the court of
appeals, observed that a court of equity has the power and authority
to make a decree based upon equitable principles in the light of all
the facts. and circumstances involved. In this case the court held that
husband and wife who acquired title to realty by adverse possession
for 20 years without color of title held jointly as tenants in common
and not as tenants by the entirety and that after the death of the pair
the heirs of each collectively held a one-half undivided interest,
PARTIES 1N EQUITY
Maxwell v. Lax'0 deals with standing to sue, holding that a private
citizen who sustains an injury to his property may maintain a suit for
injunction against continuing an obstruction to a public street or high-
7. 293 S.W.2d 30 (Tenn. App, E.S. 1956).
8..297 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. 1956).
9. 293 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955), discussed in 10 VAND. L. REV. 460
(1957), and Harbison, Domestic Relations-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L.
REV. 1082, 1093 (1957).
10. 292 S.W.2d 223 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
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way. He may sue without first obtaining permission from municipal
officials, particularly where his property is on the highway at the
point of the obstruction. A decree of a mandatory injunction, requiring
the removal of a lighted sign which had been placed on the, right-of-
way of the street by defendants and which was held to be a nuisance
because it dangerously obstructed the view of the traveling public,
obstructed the entrance to plaintiffs' land and disturbed plaintiffs by
shining in their windows, was affirmed.
CONTEMPT
One of the peculiarities of equity is that its decrees frequently con-
sist of in personam orders. The violation of such an order is contempt
of court. Contempts are classified as either civil or criminal." In
Davidson County v. Randall,2 the defendant was found guilty of con-
tempt for violating an injunction against the removal and sale, on
a commercial basis, of soil from his property located in a district zoned
for residential use. His defense to the contempt charge was that he
was not selling the dirt. The evidence showed that the soil was being
dug by the large machines and vehicles of the same contractor and
in the same way as before the injunction issued. The allowing of the
removal of the dirt by the commercial dirt hauler was held to be a
violation of the spirit of the injunction. In the course of the opinion
the statement was made that when one violates an injunction as
alleged in the petition the contempt is what is known as criminal
contempt and the laws ordinarily applicable in criminal prosecutions
apply. It was also said that the defendant is presumed to be innocent
and must be proved to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt but that
after conviction the presumption of innocence vanishes and the finding
below raises a presumption of guilt which the accused must overcome.
The holding that the case involved a criminal contempt apparently
was based on the kind of violation. The court cited as authority an
earlier decision of its own.13 The act of the defendant in the earlier
case, however, was of a different character. There the violation of the
injunction was the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, and the injunc-
tion had been issued under a statute authorizing the abating of the
particular class of acts as a public nuisance.14 The acts of the defend-
ants in the two cases were apparently crimes because the violation of
a zoning regulation is made a misdemeanor by section 13-411 of the
Tennessee Code.
Another, and perhaps better, test by which to determine whether
11. Note, 10 VAND. L. RE V. 831, 832 (1957).
12. 300 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. 1957).
13. State ex rel Anderson v. Daugherty, 137 Tenn. 125, 191 S.W. 974 (1916).
14. TENN. CODE AnN. § 23-302 (1956).
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the defendant was charged with civil or criminal contempt is the
nature of the proceeding brought against him for the violation of the
decree. If the purpose is to get relief for the plaintiff, (e.g., by having
defendant imprisoned until he obeys the court's decree),15 the pro-
ceeding is for civil contempt. If the purpose is to vindicate the author-
ity of the court and to punish the defendant for flaunting it, the
proceeding is for criminal contempt. 16 In the Randall case this test
leads to the same result that the court reached-a classification as
criminal contempt. The indication, found in the report of the case,
which bears on the purpose of the proceeding, is the sentence of the
defendant to two days in jail. If the trial judge had considered the
proceeding to be for civil contempt, he should have sentenced the
defendant to be confined until he ceased having the soil removed by
commercial dirt haulers. Had the Supreme Court expressly applied
the test of the purpose of the contempt proceeding, it would have
avoided giving the misleading impression that such a violation as is
alleged in this case can only be a criminal contempt.
In another contempt case, Matthews v. Eslinger,'7 it was held that
where defendant's bid was accepted by the master at a chancery sale
and he failed to comply therewith and defendant was notified of the
date of resale but thereafter sought no relief whatever until petition
was filed against him, defendant was liable for the deficiency and also
was guilty of contempt of court. The court of appeals en banc also
held that the ground on which he could be adjudged in contempt was
the abuse of, or unlawful interference with, the proceedings of the
court. Other points decided were that a person who bids at a chancery
sale submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court as to all matters
connected with such bid and if his bid is accepted but he does not
comply with the terms of the sale the property may be put up for sale
again and, if it sells for less, the original high bidder is liable for the
difference even though the sale to him had not been reported to, nor
confirmed by, the chancellor. He would be guilty of contempt where
he made the bid with the idea of inspecting the property before he
complied with the terms of the order of sale and in furtherance of his
scheme obtained from the master an extension of time from Saturday
to Monday to comply with his bid. The opinion also says that the
master may allow the highest bidder a reasonable time to comply with
his bid which might be a day or a week but should not be so long as
to leave no time for readvertising the property.
15. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-904 (1956); GIBSON, SUITS m CHANCERY § 968
(5th ed. 1956).
16. State ex rel. Anderson v. Daugherty, 137 Tenn. 125, 127, 191 S.W. 974
(1916).
17. 292 S.W.2d 543 (Tenn. App. 1955) (en banc).
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PRACTICE
The 1957 General Assembly 8 amended the practice in chancery
courts in Tennessee so as to provide that a sworn answer, when re-
quired by a bill of discovery or when the oath to the answer is not
waived, shall have no more weight or effect in evidence than the depo-
sition of the defendant filing such answer.
18. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1957, c. 153, TEnw. CODE AmN. § 21-628 (Supp. 1957).
